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The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994
Violence Against Women Act: Struck
Down but Not Ruled Out
JULIE GOLDSCHEID*
I. Introduction
The 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)' was historic in
many respects. Although federal legislation previously had addressed vio-
lence against women in a smattering of contexts, VAWA represented the
first federal attempt comprehensively to address the myriad social and
legal problems faced by victims of domestic and sexual violence.' Among
its numerous provisions, VAWA created new federal felonies;3 required
* Associate professor, CUNY School of Law. As senior staff attorney at Legal Momentum
(formerly known as NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), the author litigated the UnitedStates v. Morrison case in the district, circuit and Supreme courts, and has been involved in sev-
eral of the legislative initiatives described in this article. Many thanks to Beryl Blaustone for hercomments on a previous draft, to Elizabeth Bruise, Jackie DeVore, and Shira Galinsky, for their
most helpful research assistance, and to Vicki Konkowski for her administrative support.
1. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981) (1994) (struck as unconstitutional by United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
2. Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 64 (2002). Previous federal legislation had
addressed domestic and sexual violence, but no public law previously had sought comprehen-
sively to address the problem. See, e.g., Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §
10401 et seq. (enacted 1984 with the purpose of increasing public awareness about and preventing
family violence, supporting shelter and related assistance for victims and helping law enforcement
and private agencies improve their responses to family violence); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (enacted 1974 to address child abuse
and neglect). Federal criminal law had addressed violence against women within its jurisdictional
limits. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2248 (2004) (criminalizing sexual assault).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2004) (establishing federal offense for interstate domestic vio-lence); 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2004) (establishing federal offense for interstate violation of protec-
tion order).
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states to recognize protective orders issued by other jurisdictions;4 and
provided means by which battered immigrant women could obtain immi-
gration status without having to rely on their batterers.5 It also authorized
federal funding for an array of programs that would support services6 and
improve law enforcement responses to domestic violence and sexual
assault survivors,7 and mandated research on violence against women and
reports on issues such as campus sexual assault and the use of battered
women's syndrome testimony.8
Perhaps the most controversial provision in VAWA was its civil rights
remedy. That new law was modeled after other civil rights legislation and
authorized a victim of gender-motivated violence to bring a civil cause of
action against the perpetrator.9 As such, it offered a powerful remedy for
victims of gender-based violence, such as domestic violence and sexual
assault. The goals of the VAWA civil rights remedy were manifold and
complex. They can be thought of as falling into two broad categories. The
first was practical. The civil rights remedy sought to provide a cause of
action that would be useful to victims of gender-motivated crime who
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2004); see also, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across
State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate
Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REv. 827 (2004) (examining
state responsibility to grant full faith and credit to domestic violence protection orders from
other states).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (2004) (authorizing alien petitioning rights for immediate rel-
atives whose spouses or parents have subjected them to battering or extreme cruelty and whose
deportation would result in extreme hardship); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2004) (authorizing suspen-
sion of deportation for victims of domestic violence).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10416 (2004) (authorizing funding to support a national domes-
tic violence hotline); 42 U.S.C. § 10418 (2004) (authorizing grants to nonprofit organizations
to establish community projects to coordinate domestic violence intervention and prevention);
42 U.S.C. § 13971 (2004) (authorizing grants to states, Indian tribal governments and local gov-
ernments of rural states, or to other public or private entities in rural states to enhance services
for domestic violence and child abuse survivors).
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (2004) (authorizing grants to assist states, state and local
courts and governments to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution
strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen victim serv-
ices in cases involving violent crimes against women); 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh (2004) (authorizing
grants to encourage states, local governments and courts to treat domestic violence as a serious
violation of criminal law).
8. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13961-13963 (2004) (establishing research agenda to increase
understanding of violence against women); 42 U.S.C. § 14012 (2004) (mandating study on cam-
pus sexual assault); 42 U.S.C. § 14013 (2004) (mandating report on the use of battered women's
syndrome evidence); 42 U.S.C. § 14014 (2004) (mandating report on confidentiality of address-
es for domestic violence victims); 42 U.S.C. § 14015 (2004) (mandating report on recordkeep-
ing issues relating to criminal complaints of domestic violence).
9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (struck as unconstitutional by United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). See infra n.28, for a discussion of the elements of a claim under
the VAWA civil rights remedy.
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otherwise might lack an adequate remedy under then-existing laws. For
example, family law attorneys representing battered women brought claims
under the new law as a means of obtaining compensation from the clients'
abusers. The second goal was aspirational. The law sought to transform
the terms of debate in which violence against women was framed, to bring
public attention to its severity and impact, and to counter the historic sub-
ordination violence against women both reflects and perpetuates.
The Supreme Court struck the law as an unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional authority in United States v. Morrison.'° That decision was
heavily criticized by civil rights advocates and others as a setback to
women's rights and as one of a line of cases in which the Supreme Court
set newly restrictive limits on Congress' power." The loss of the federal
civil rights remedy was significant and leaves many without recourse.' 2
Nevertheless, the Morrison decision by no means eliminates legal claims
asserting that violence against women violates victims' civil rights.
Moreover, the litigation and associated public debate surrounding the civil
rights remedy advanced public awareness of violence against women as a
problem of discrimination.' 3 The Morrison decision has not ended that trans-
formative process; nor has it curtailed its associated legal and policy
advances.
Both pre-existing and newly created legal remedies continue to provide
redress for violence against women as a civil rights violation.' 4 Federal and
state laws remain vital vehicles for advancing the two broadly conceived
10. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty, 114 HARv. L. REv.
135 (2000); Sally F. Goldfarb, Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 57 (2002);
Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619
(2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2002); Julie Goldscheid, United States v.
Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law
Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 109 (2000).
12. A fuller discussion of the ramifications of the loss of the civil rights remedy is beyond
the scope of this article. This article will focus instead on the remedies that remain available and
those that have emerged following the Morrison decision.
13. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women:
Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AMER. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 258
(2003) (arguing that VAWA's civil rights remedy changed the terms of the debate about vio-
lence against women and inspired new and expansive legislative and policy efforts).
14. Although both men and women can be victims of gender-based violence, this article
will refer to the problem as one of violence against women, in recognition that most gender-
based violence is committed by men against women. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISTON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, (NCJ 197838 2003), (reporting,
inter alia, that violence by an intimate partner accounted for twenty percent of all nonfatal violent
crime experienced by women in 2001 and three percent of the nonfatal violent crime experienced
by men that same year).
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goals of VAWA: providing civil redress for victims of gender-based vio-
lence and transforming public dialog about the ways violence against
women violates women's civil rights. Although the Morrison decision
struck down the 1994 law, it did not bar alternate approaches to address-
ing those still-crucial goals.
This article will review and analyze legal theories and strategies that
remain available to those seeking redress for the civil rights violations
violence against women produces. It will start by briefly summarizing the
civil rights remedy's history, including its use during the years in which it
was in effect. The article will then review the range of laws still available
to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault in seeking civil redress for
the civil rights violations that result. This discussion will include new laws
and legislative proposals modeled after the VAWA civil rights remedy
enacted by states and localities; the pre-VAWA state statutes that authorize
civil recovery for bias-motivated violence based on sex; and the reach of
both traditional and newly enacted legislation prohibiting sex discrimination
to address discriminatory acts and practices that interfere with victims' civil
rights and prevent their economic independence and full participation.
II. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy's
Abbreviated and Controversial History
The VAWA civil rights remedy sought explicitly to connect violence
against women with the longstanding manifestations of sex inequality that
perpetuate women's second-class citizenship. It has been described as "the
most ambitious and most visible attempt ever made in this country to apply
the discrimination model to violence against women,"' 15 and as an "historic"
step towards equality for women. 6 By situating women's experience of
violence within the category of sex discrimination, the civil rights remedy
refrained the problem as a public, societal, and political concern rather than
a private matter of interpersonal dynamics or pathology. 7
The law enabled claimants to identify and seek redress for domestic
and sexual violence as problems of sex inequality. 8 This had significance
15. Goldfarb, Applying Discrimination Model, supra note 13, at 253.
16. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty, supra note 11, at 138; Sally F. Goldfarb, "No
Civilized System of Justice": The Fate of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV.
499, 500 (2000); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 181-
82 (2000).
17. Sally F. Goldfarb, Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
18. Id. at 17; MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty, supra note 11, at 138. In this sense,
the VAWA civil rights remedy builds on the evolution of sexual harassment law. Sexual
harassment at work historically was viewed as a private tort. Early claims were rejected as
falling outside the scope of conduct for which employers should be responsible and about which
federal courts would exercise jurisdiction. The recognition of sexual harassment instead as a
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both in terms of the types of evidence that could be offered in a particular
case 19 and in terms of the claims' anticipated broader social impact. 20 It
was modeled after federal civil rights laws, which historically have been
instrumental in redressing systematic deprivations of equality and citizen-
ship.2' The law sought to reinforce women's status as equal citizens and
to counter the inequality that violence against women enforces.22
During the debates preceding the civil rights remedy's enactment, the
legislation was subject to criticism from a range of perspectives. Prominent
opponents included Justice Rehnquist, who, in his capacity as chair of the
Judicial Conference, objected to the law as an over extension of Congress's
legislative power that could open the door to federal jurisdiction over
broader areas of criminal and family law traditionally reserved to the states.23
Others, such as the ACLU, objected that the law was too vague,24 that it
would dilute existing civil rights remedies, and that the burden would fall
most heavily on men of color. 25 Still others questioned whether the poten-
problem of discrimination refrained the issue as a systemic and widespread problem and has
resulted in a transformation of workplace policies that address the issue. See generally, e.g.,
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (arguing that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 691, 698-729 (1997) (tracing evolution of sexual
harassment law); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (discussing sexual harassment as an example
of enduring sex discrimination in the workplace).
19. See infra n. 32, and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Gil Freeman, April 1991, S. Hrg. 102-369, at 125 (recounting during hearing
on the civil rights remedy the ways that a civil rights claim can gamer public attention and lead
to change in ways that tort law claims cannot). As Reva Siegel observed in analyzing the civil
rights remedy's refraining of intimate violence as a civil rights violation: "The very struggle
over the interpretation of VAWA's civil rights remedy will, of necessity, modemize gender sta-
tus discourse.... Considered in larger historical perspective, controversy over the civil rights
remedy contained in the Violence Against Women Act has set in motion a legal regime that will
restate sexual assault law in the gender mores of American society at the dawn of the twenty-
first century." Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2206 (1996).
21. Goldfarb, Persistence of Privacy, supra note 17, at 17-18.
22. Id.
23. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-end Report on the Federal Judiciary,
Third Branch, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3. The Judicial Conference eventually took no position on the
Civil Rights Remedy after amendments narrowed the law's scope. See Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 28
(1993). See generally Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary, Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. .269, 272-73 (2000) (dis-
cussing evolution of Judicial Conference's position).
24. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6 & n.184 (1996) (citing
testimony of Elizabeth Symonds, then-ACLU Legislative Director).
25. Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 401 (2002); Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against
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tial the law represented could be realized by women who might lack access
to information about the law or to the legal system itself.26
The civil rights remedy's statutory formulation was modified during
the four years of debate that preceded its enactment.27 As enacted, the law
contained two basic elements of proof: a plaintiff would have to establish
that: (1) she was the victim of a "crime of violence" of sufficient severity to
meet the statutory criteria;28 and (2) would have to establish that the act was"gender-motivated. " 29 Under that second prong, a plaintiff would have to
prove that the act was committed "because of gender or on the basis of
gender," and "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gen-
der."3 Some advocates and scholars feared that these statutory require-
ments, particularly the definitional requirement that "animus" be proved
as part of the "gender-motivation" element, might bar many from the
relief the law was intended to provide.31
Notwithstanding these concerns, as a practical matter, the law held
promise for several reasons. The civil rights remedy allowed plaintiffs to
describe the harm they suffered more accurately than they would under
traditional tort laws by making circumstantial evidence of discrimination
directly relevant. 32 It facilitated access to representation by authorizing fee
shifting for successful plaintiffs,33 and it contained a number of other proce-
Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist
Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463, 497-501 (1996).
26. See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: A Promise Waiting
to be Fulfilled, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 409, 414-18 (1996).
27. For a recounting of the legislative history and concerns raised over the narrowing of the
statutory formulation, see, e.g., Nourse, supra note 24; Goldfarb, supra note. 17 at 45-57.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(d)(2) (1994) (subsequently repealed). The statute contained a two-
part definition of the term "crime of violence." The plaintiff first would have to establish that
the "act or series of acts.., would constitute a felony against the person" or "against property
if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another," 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (d)(2)(A);
and that the act came within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994), which is a federal statute
defining "crime of violence."
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(d)(1) (1994) (subsequently repealed).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 24, at 29 & n.157 (1996); Goldfarb, supra note 17, at 45-
57; accord Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 260-69 (suggesting that the narrowly defined statutory
terms may have unduly limited the law's effectiveness).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994) (requiring proof of gender motivation). Accordingly, evi-
dence of a defendants' misogynist epithets or other circumstantial evidence of gender-bias
would be relevant to a civil rights remedy claim, but might not be relevant to a claim for bat-
tery or assault. For a fuller discussion of the circumstantial evidence that could be probative in
VAWA civil rights remedy cases, see, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence:
Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123
(1999).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (amended by VAWA to include the civil rights remedy as one
of the statutes under which prevailing parties could recover attorneys' fees).
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dural and strategic advantages.34 It provided a cause of action for women
where criminal prosecutions or state law tort claims may have been barred
due to interspousal immunity doctrines.35 It provided a remedy to those
whose state law tort claims would have been barred by short statutes of
limitations that did not take into account the difficulty of commencing a civil
claim in the aftermath of domestic or sexual violence.36 It also responded
to the inadequacies of the criminal justice system by providing a remedy
that victims, not prosecutors, would control. Perhaps most important, it
allowed a civil rights lawsuit against individuals in circumstances not oth-
erwise covered by then-existing civil rights laws.37 The law held particular
promise for victims of domestic and sexual violence who now had an addi-
34. For example, the civil rights remedy explicitly authorized recovery under the civil "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" rather than the more onerous "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard that governs criminal matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994). Federal court offered a
favored venue, particularly for plaintiffs whose perpetrators were members of or familiar with,
local law enforcement and judiciary officials. See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 260; Goldfarb,
supra note 17, at 539; Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 505, 521 (1995) (recounting Congress's
preference for the federal forum, and explaining that federal court may be preferable for cases
in which local bias or familiarity between defendants and state court officials may prove prob-
lematic). In addition, a federal civil action would be covered by the newly enacted amendment
to the federal rape shield law, which VAWA extended to cover civil as well as criminal pro-
ceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 412 (covering civil and criminal cases, as amended by VAWA, Pub.
L. 103-322, § 40141). That amendment responded to Congressional findings that state laws lim-
iting rape shield provisions to criminal prosecutions exposed women bringing tort actions based
on domestic or sexual violence to intrusive questioning that could deter them from bringing suit
or impact the outcome. S. Rep. No. 102-97, at 46 (1991).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (1994) (authorizing cause of action regardless of
whether the acts actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution or conviction). As Senate
Reports preceding VAWA's enactment recounted, as of 1990, seven states did not permit pros-
ecutions of marital rape; 26 others allowed marital rape prosecutions only under limited cir-
cumstances, such as where there was evidence of physical injury; and numerous other states
limited prosecutions of cohabitants or dating companions. S. Rep. No. 103-38 (1993), at 42; S.
Rep. No. 102-97 (1991), at 45 & nn.49-50, 54; S. Rep. No. 101-545 (1990), at 41 n.78. Ten
states still formally barred women from bringing tort actions against their abusive husbands.
Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong. 64 (1990)
(statement of Helen Neubome, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
36. The VAWA civil rights remedy provided a longer statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658 (2004) (four year statute of limitations), than most state civil actions, which generally
provide a two to three-year limitations period. See THOMAS M. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD,
IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 53 (2001).
37. Goldfarb, Applying Discrimination, supra note 13, at 260; Goldfarb, Persistence of
Privacy, supra note 17, at 56. Preexisting civil rights laws addressed domestic and sexual vio-
lence that took place in the workplace and at schools, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004); Title IX of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1868 (2004);
certain acts of sexual violence committed under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004); and
conspiracies to deprive someone of her civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2004). No federal law
addressed most cases of rape and domestic violence, which take place in private settings and are
committed by private individuals. Goldfarb, Use and Abuse of Federalism, supra n. 11, at 72-73.
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tional remedy, with fewer barriers, through which they could seek redress
from their abusers.
As the first VAWA civil rights claims were brought, defendants imme-
diately challenged the law as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
legislative power.38 Accordingly, instead of focusing on issues of statutory
interpretation, the initial litigation centered on the scope of Congress's
power to legislate under the commerce clause and the enforcement clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the two primary constitutional bases Congress
invoked in enacting the law. As the first cases made their way through the
courts, nearly all of the lower courts to address the issue upheld the law's
constitutionality.3 9 One of the few courts that found the law unconstitu-
tional, however, was the District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic, a college freshman alleged she was
sexually assaulted by several student members of the school's football
team in a college dorm.4" Ms. Brzonkala's civil rights remedy claim made
its way to the Supreme Court, where it was litigated under the name
United States v. Morrison. The Court struck the civil rights remedy as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under both the Commerce
Clause and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
While it was still in effect, the civil rights remedy produced a body of
decisions under which judges interpreted the new statutory terms. Despite
concern that the statutory language including proof of "animus" as part of
the formulation of "gender-motivation" would bar relief, most courts rec-
ognized that violent crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), affd en banc 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999); aff d sub nom United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000).
39. Until the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the law was unconstitutional, all
fourteen district courts to have considered the law's constitutionality had upheld it as a permis-
sible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-
572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp.2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d
64 (D. Mass. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431, 1998 WL 1100062 (D. Kan.
July 10, 1998); Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp.,
No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. New York City
Housing Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp.
1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
40. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
41. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Justices Souter and Breyer, in separate dissents, contested the
majority's Commerce Clause ruling. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Breyer additionally questioned the Court's Fourteenth Amendment holding, Id.
at 664. See supra note 11, for a listing of some of the commentary criticizing the decision.
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were gender-motivated.42 The statutory requirement that the act be a "crime
of violence," as the statute defined that term, proved to be somewhat more
problematic for plaintiffs, although even that statutory formulation did not
bar many claims.43 Although it is impossible to predict what contours the
caselaw would have taken had the law been upheld, the cases adjudicated
during the civil rights remedy's short life have created a foundation that can
be drawn on in gender-based civil rights claims under alternative statutory
schemes.
Il. State and Local Legislative
Responses to the Morrison Decision
In the course of striking the law on federalism grounds, the Morrison
majority declared that the Court could "think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders... reposed in the States, than the sup-
pression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." With that reason-
ing, the Court essentially invited states and localities to enact comparable
civil rights legislation. California, Illinois, New York City, and Westchester
followed up on this invitation and enacted civil rights remedies that were
modeled after the now-defunct federal law.45 Other states have introduced
legislative proposals that sought to fill the gap left by the Morrison opinion
but have not yet been enacted.46 Other than restricting plaintiffs to a state
42. Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias Crimes-
Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 265, 273-83 (2001)
(recounting cases interpreting "gender motivation" requirement); cf. J. Rebekka S. Bonner,
Reconceptualizing VAWA's "Animus" for Rape in States' Emerging Post-VAWA Civil Rights
Legislation, Il l YALE L.J. 1417 (2002) (recommending framework for analyzing gender-moti-
vation under new civil rights remedies). Most courts evaluating whether a claim contained evi-
dence of gender motivation relied on circumstantial evidence such as gender-based epithets,
patterns of behavior, statements reflecting gender-based bias, to reach their conclusions. See
Goldscheid, supra note 32. Statements in the legislative history, such as those by Senator Biden
that the law would not cover "random muggings or beatings in the home or elsewhere" or"everyday domestic violence" as opposed to "discriminatory domestic violence," led attorneys
bringing VAWA civil rights remedy claims to ensure that claims contained that type of cir-
cumstantial evidence; see Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 270 (citing legislative history).
43. Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 42, at 271-72 n.27 (2001) (summarizing cases inter-
preting "crime of violence" requirement).
44. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
45. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 52.4 (West 2004); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (West
2004); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-901 (2000); Westchester County, NY, Laws of Westchester
County ch. 701 (2001). New York City's City Council expressly referenced the Morrison deci-
sion in its legislative findings stating that it enacted this law "[in light of the void left by the
Supreme Court's decision," to ensure that victims had an "officially sanctioned and legitimate
cause of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from gender-motivated violence."
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-902 (2000).
46. See, e.g., S.B. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2000) (proposing civil liability for
"crime of violence motivated by gender"); A.B. 6636, 2003-04 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-
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versus federal forum, these laws provide virtually identical substantive
relief, with similar elements of proof, to that which was provided for in
the now-unavailable federal law.47 At least as a theoretical matter, these
laws should serve as a rough substitute for the VAWA civil rights reme-
dy in the jurisdictions in which they have been enacted.
In addition to these state reforms, members of Congress have introduced
post-Morrison civil rights remedy legislation. These proposals would retain
the essential civil cause of action but would amend the language of the
1994 law to avoid the aspects the Supreme Court found constitutionally
infirm.4 To date, however, none of the federal proposals have been enacted.
The state statutes enacted after the Morrison decision have received little
public attention and do not yet appear to be widely used. One can speculate
about the reasons for the laws' limited use, although it is difficult to deter-
mine whether any underutilization reflects a lack of general awareness
about the law's availability, some structural limitation of an approach that
provides a private cause of action for a civil rights violation, or the rela-
tive superiority of a federal forum.4 9 To date, only one reported decision
involves a survivor's attempt to use any of these new laws. In Cadiz-Jones
v. Zambetti, a domestic violence survivor brought a claim against her former
fianc6 based on allegations of his ongoing physical abuse and violence.5°
She brought suit under New York City's then-recently enacted law after her
VAWA civil rights remedy claim in federal court was dismissed in response
to the Morrison decision. The court rejected the defendant's arguments
that the local law would not apply retroactively, and that the new city law
was preempted by state legislation governing statutes of limitations for
04); A.B. 6380, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003-04) (proposing civil cause of action for
victims of gender-violence); H.B. 141, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2003-04) (propos-
ing civil cause of action for victims of criminal offenses committed at least in part based on the
victim's gender, including offenses that cause harm to the person's "unborn"); H.B. 2057, 2003
Leg. (Pa. 2003) (proposing civil cause of action for "crime of violence motivated by gender");
S.B. 403, 2003 Leg. (Pa. 2003) (same); H.B. 1691, 83rd Gen. Ass. (Ark. 2001) (proposing civil
cause of action for "act of violence motivated by gender"). Notably, one version of the proposed
New York legislation listed as its justification an effort to fill the void left by the Morrison
opinion. Sponsors memo: New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation A
6636.
47. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995) (discussing relative advantages of federal versus state fora).
48. See Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 394, 108th
Cong. (2003) (adding jurisdictional element in response to the Morrison opinion's Commerce
Clause analysis); Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 429,
107th Cong. (2001) (same); Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2000,
H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000) (same).
49. See infra notes [77-82] and accompanying text for a discussion of possible limitations
of the VAWA civil rights remedy's reach.
50. Cadiz-Jones v. Zambetti, 227 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 29, 2002, at 21.
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intentional torts.5 It reviewed the law's legislative history and concluded
that the New York City Council had enacted the law to fill the void creat-
ed when the United States Supreme Court struck the VAWA civil rights
remedy, and that the City Council sought to restore a cause of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence.52 According to the court, it could
give effect to the legislative purpose driving the law only by allowing the
plaintiff's claim to proceed, since her VAWA civil rights claim was struck
and dismissed before a federal court could adjudicate her claims.53
Although the decision currently stands alone, it demonstrates that these
state laws hold potential for survivors seeking civil recovery from their
abusers.
IV. State Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-motivated Violence
Although the VAWA civil rights remedy was the first express federal
legislative acknowledgment that violence against women violates women's
rights, many state and local laws provided similar relief even before
VAWA was enacted. Many states had, and continue to have, laws on the
books that provide civil as well as criminal remedies for bias-motivated
violence.54 Since many of these laws are part of the state's bias crime
statutes, they will be referenced here as the "state gender-bias crime"
laws. Currently, eleven states and the District of Columbia include "sex"
or "gender" as one of the categories that can give rise to civil recovery
under those state bias crime frameworks. 55
Not unlike the state civil rights laws enacted after Morrison, these laws
are neither widely used nor widely publicized. Their relative lack of use
may similarly reflect the public's general lack of awareness about the laws'
existence and the redress they authorize.56 Although these laws authorize suit
in a state rather than a federal forum, and although they offer only a patch-




54. Many of these laws are part of their states' bias crime statutes. See Anti-Defamation
League State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, www.adl.org/99hatecrime/print.asp (appendix
A), last visited Feb. 19, 2004) (listing statutory provisions); Lu-IN WANG, HATE CRwts LAW
(1999) (listing and discussing statutory provisions).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1(a), (c) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 729A.2, 729A.5 (West 2004);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.12, §§ I IH, I (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b
(2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611 A.79 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113 (2004); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1(b) (2004); RI. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2
(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1455(a), 1457 (2004); WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083
(West 2004).
56. See supra note 49; infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
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relief that is similar to, if not broader than, that provided by either the VAWA
civil rights remedy or the state civil rights statutes that were modeled after
the VAWA provision.57
Several substantive and procedural comparisons highlight the state laws'
potential reach. For example, in contrast to the VAWA civil rights remedy,
which contained a relatively complex formulation for proving gender-
motivation,58 many of the state statutes allow recovery based on the more
simple proof that the individual suffered an injury based on her actual or
perceived sex or gender.59 Most of the state statutes authorize a broad range
of remedies like those Congress authorized under the VAWA civil rights
remedy. For example, most of these state laws allow plaintiffs to recover
damages for emotional distress 6° as well as punitive damages.6' Most also
expressly authorize injunctive relief in addition to money damages.62
57. Id. Notably, these statutes have tended to be overlooked by those discussing civil rights
remedies available to victims of gender-based violence in the aftermath of the Morrison deci-
sion. See, e.g., Bonner, Reconceptualizing VAWA's "Animus," supra note 42 (discussing only
legislation modeled after the VAWA civil rights statute in discussing post-Morrison civil rights
remedies); Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media's Treatment of VAWA's
Civil Rights Remedy, 9 MiCH. J. GENDER & L. 327 (2003) (surveying media coverage of VAWA
civil rights remedy and state legislation enacted after Morrison).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(d)(1) (requiring proof that the act be committed "because of gender
or on the basis of gender, and due, in part, to an animus based on gender"). See supra note 29.
59. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704(a) (2004) (allowing recovery for injury based on
victim's actual or perceived sex); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1(c) (West 2004) (allow-
ing recovery for injury based on victim's actual or perceived gender); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
729A.2, 729.A5 (West 2004) (allowing recovery for physical, emotional or financial harm
resulting from hate crime committed because of sex); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 32
(West 2004) (defining hate crime as including acts committed based on "gender... prejudice");
MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(1) (2004) (defining ethnic intimidation to include injury
committed because of an individual's gender); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.79(1) (2004) (defin-
ing "bias offense" as including crimes committed because of the victim's actual or perceived
sex); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113 (2004) (providing civil cause of action for bias crime commit-
ted "because of" the plaintiff's gender); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(a) (West 2004) (creating
civil offense for criminal intimidation based on gender); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1455(a), 1457
(2004) (establishing civil cause of action for crime "maliciously motivated" by actual or per-
ceived sex); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-l(a) (2004) (establishing cause of action for conspira-
cy to interfere with statutory or constitutional right under federal or state law based on gender);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (West 2004).
60. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704(a)(2) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1(c)
(West 2004); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(3) (2004) (authorizing damages for emotional
distress but limiting amount to three times the actual damages or two-thousand dollars, whichever
is greater); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.79(2) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(d)(1) (2004).
61. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704(a)(3) (2004); 720 11. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
7.1(c) (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.79(2) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-
21(d)(3) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1457 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083
(West 2004) (allowing punitive damages up to ten-thousand dollars).
62. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 729A.2, 729.5 (West 2004); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
12 § 111 (West 2004); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(3) (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.79(2) (2004); NEB. REv. STAT. §28-113 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(d)(4)
(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1457 (2004).
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Virtually all of the state statutes allow successful plaintiffs to recover
attorneys' fees. 63 Many state laws are governed by statutes of limitations
that are longer than what a victim would be bound by in a traditional tort
action.' Some mirror the VAWA civil rights remedy in specifying that
the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 6' Given this com-
parable if not broader coverage, to the extent that the VAWA civil rights
remedy held both practical and transformational potential, these analogous
state laws should hold similar, if not identical, promise.
What is remarkable about the body of decisions under these laws, beyond
its small size, is that none of the reported decisions analyze the merits of
the claim of gender-motivated harm. The majority of decisions involve
allegations of sexual harassment at work in which the threshold question
concerning the state civil rights statute was whether that law authorized
recovery that was duplicative of recovery available under other state
laws.66 Courts upheld claims under the state civil rights statute where the
alleged wrongdoing was not covered by another state law, such as the
state statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on sex.6 7 Yet
63. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3704(a)(4) (2004); 720 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1(c)
(West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.5 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § ch. 12, § 111
(West 2004); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(3)(b) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113(1)
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(d)(1)(West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D- 1 (b)(2004); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1457 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083 (2004); but see MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.79 (2004) (no provision for attorneys' fees in civil bias recovery statute).
64. See supra note 36, and accompanying text. Many of the state civil bias crime laws are
governed by longer statutes of limitations than what would apply under traditional tort law. See,
e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/25 (West 2004) (ten-year statute of limitations); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.79(5)(b) (2004) (six-year statute of limitations); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-
113(2) (2004) (four-year statute of limitations); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-905(a) (2004); but
see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.5 (West 2004) (two-year statute of limitations).
65. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.79(3) (2004); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-113(3) (2004).
66. Compare, e.g., O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1987) (upholding civil
rights claim because Massachusetts employment discrimination law didn't then cover the small
employer defendant) with Bergeson v. Franchi, 783 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1992) (barring
claim based on sexual assault and harassment at work because it was covered by state antidis-
crimination law); Doe v. Purity Supreme, 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996) (barring claim under
Massachusetts civil rights law for rape and sexual assault by co-worker because it was covered
by state antidiscrimination law); Guzman v. Lowenger, 664 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1996) (barring
claim based on sexual assault and harassment at work because it was covered by state antidis-
crimination law); Brimage v. City of Boston, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 154 (Suffolk Cty. 2001)
(barring claim based on sexual assault and rape by supervisor because it was covered by state
antidiscrimination law); Dahms v. Cognex Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 575 (Middlesex
Cty. 2000) (barring claim based on sexual assault and harassment at work because it was cov-
ered by state antidiscrimination law); Kennedy v. Duggan, No. 94-2837, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 583 (Middlesex Cty. 2000) (same); and Damato v. Jack Phelan Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 927
F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Il. 1996) (barring claim under the Illinois hate crime law for employment
sexual harassment and assault based on legislative intent to prevent duplicative claims.
67. See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (sexual harass-
ment by apartment manager); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1987) (workplace
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even those decisions upholding claims have focused on procedural issues,
rather than analyzing the merits of the claims.68
Cases outside of the sexual harassment context also have hinged on
procedural rather than substantive analyses. For example, a case arising out
of domestic violence that included a claim under the VAWA civil rights
remedy contained, and upheld, a claim under the state statute prohibiting
malicious harassment "motivated by the perpetrator's perception of the
victim's gender." 69 The court rejected an argument that the claim was
time-barred and upheld the state civil rights claim without addressing its
merits.7° A claim that a male National Guard member sexually assaulted
a fellow (male) guard member during a hazing ritual was upheld against
an immunity challenge, and the plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees was
sustained.7 Similarly, a tenant who was sexually harassed by her apartment
manager was able to proceed with her claim under the California civil
statute authorizing damage relief from gender-motivated violence based on
the court's determination that respondent superior liability could apply.72
The Zenobile v. McKecuen decision offers the most extensive discussion
of the merits of a claim seeking civil recovery based on gender motivated
violence. 73 That case arose out of events that took place at a social gathering
at the defendant, McKecuen's, parents' house. Nicole Zenobile was a dis-
patcher for the Elizabeth City Police Department (ECPD), and the defen-
dant, McKecuen was an officer with the department. During the gathering,
Zenobile "became helpless," and McKecuen videotaped her after others
had removed her bathing suit.74 McKecuen displayed the videotape to
other people at the house that night and to members of the police depart-
ment and others the following day.75 The complaint alleged that
McKecuen and others mixed a drink that caused her to become uncon-
scious and that when she regained consciousness, she was being sexually
assaulted by one of the other men at the gathering. The reported decision
on the civil rights claim involves Zenobile's appeal of the trial court's
dismissal of her claim against a woman involved in the videotaping and
sexual harassment case against small employer not otherwise covered by state employment dis-
crimination law in effect at the time).
68. See supra note 66.
69. Zeigler v. Zeigler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 618 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
70. Id.
71. Day v. Towle, No. 20-0276, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 659 (Mar. 19,2001) (upholding
attorneys' fees claim); Day v. Massachusetts Air. Nat'l Guard, 167 F.3d 678 (1st Cir. 1989)
(rejecting immunity defense).
72. Beliveau v. Chris Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Her claims under
the Fair Housing Act and other state civil rights acts were upheld as well.
73. Zenobile v. McKeucuen, 548 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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alleged subsequent cover-up. The court concluded that the defendant,
along with two others, "acted upon a common scheme" to harass and dis-
credit Zenobile in furtherance of a common scheme "to interfere" with her"civil rights as a woman.- 7 6 Nevertheless, even this decision did not
explain what it meant for the defendants' conduct to violate the victim's
civil rights.
The relative lack of use of these state statutes stands in stark contrast to
the interest and attention generated by the federal law.7 7 Yet some have
suggested that VAWA was underutilized as well. In addition to litigants'
lack of awareness of what the law would offer, this phenomenon could
also reflect the constitutional controversy that surrounded the VAWA
civil rights remedy since its enactment78 or the narrow crafting of its statu-
tory terms. 79 The apparent limited use of the more broadly crafted state
laws raises the question whether the utility of a civil remedy in this con-
text may be limited by systemic factors, such as domestic violence victims'
reluctance to re-engage with the batterer, or their fears that the batterer will
use the civil litigation context as a further device for perpetuating a pattem
of coercion and control over her.8° The laws may be underutilized as well
due to the difficulty victims of domestic and sexual violence continue to
face in obtaining counsel notwithstanding fee-shifting provisions.81 In
addition, these laws may not offer the remedies most victims of domestic
and sexual violence seek, such as financial assistance (from sources other
than the batterer), jobs, childcare, immigration assistance, and legal repre-
82sentation. Nevertheless, to the extent that civil remedies can offer practical
assistance and can be a catalyst for the transformation the VAWA civil
rights remedy's drafters hoped to inspire, the state statutes may in time
advance both goals for victims of gender-based violence.
76. Id. at 111.
77. Cf. Russell, supra note 57.
78. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 193 (2000).
79. See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 260-69.
80. Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 11 AM. U. J.
OF GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L., 417, 422-23 (2003).
81. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/ll World, 79
TULANE L. REV. 167 222 nn.278-84 (2004) (forthcoming) (describing challenges domestic and
sexual violence victims face in obtaining legal counsel); see also, e.g., Jennifer Wriggens,
Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 135-37 (2001) (explaining how lack of insur-
ance coverage for domestic violence reduces availability of legal counsel for domestic violence
victims seeking to bring tort claims). Domestic violence victims represented by legal aid or
legal services lawyers may be precluded from representing domestic violence victims in dam-
ages claims. See Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are We
Revictimizing Our Clients? 39 FAM. L.Q. 7 (2005).
82. Goldscheid, supra note 80, at 418.
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V. Expanding Concepts of Civil Rights
Redress for Gender-based Violence
The civil rights formulations reflected in the VAWA civil rights remedy
and analogous state civil bias crime laws are not the only avenues through
which survivors of domestic and sexual violence can recover for the civil
rights violations they sustain as a result of the violence. Of course, the
VAWA civil rights remedy, and its state and local analogs, are significant
because they render violence against women a civil rights violation
regardless of the context in which it occurs. One of the primary arguments
in support of the civil rights remedy was the lack of remedies for gender-
based violence that occurs outside of traditionally recognized contexts
such as employment, or violence committed by a state actor. The impor-
tance of a broad-ranging remedy that reaches all instances of gender-based
violence, including domestic violence and sexual assault, regardless of the
context in which it is committed, cannot be underestimated.
However, existing laws remain an important source of relief and continue
to assist victims of gender-based violence harmed under circumstances
covered by them. New interpretations of those existing laws, and new leg-
islation specifically addressing the types of discrimination victims of
domestic and sexual violence face when coping with the violence, advance
the VAWA civil rights remedy's goals by identifying and providing redress
for the complex ways violence interferes with its victims' civil rights.
A. Traditional Antidiscrimination and Civil Rights Laws and
Gender-based Violence
Even under traditional interpretations, courts readily recognize that rape
or sexual assault in the workplace may violate the victim's equality rights.83
It is well settled that a single instance of rape or sexual harassment com-
mitted by a supervisor or agent may create a hostile enviromnent under laws
prohibiting sexual harassment at work and in school.84 Sexual violence
may also constitute illegal sexual harassment when it was committed by a
83. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual assault by super-
visor with whom employee had a prior social relationship). This is true both in the workplace,
see, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002); and in school sex-
ual harassment cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Me.
1999) (sexual assault in school).
84. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (single incident didn't
have to be sexual in nature if it was committed because victim was a woman); Brock v. United
States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) ("every rape committed in the employment setting
is also discrimination based on the employee's sex"); Jones v. United States Gypsum, 81 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1695 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (upholding sexual harassment claim based on
assault in genital area, including discussion citing cases).
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coworker or a nonemployee such as a customer, when it involved the
workplace and when the employer knew or should have known of the
abuse and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action.85
Because sexual harassment laws apply evenhandedly to all employees,
regardless of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, these
laws apply to sexual violence within intimate relationships as well, and
may have ramifications for an employer when the violence is committed
at work.86 Other employment laws, such as the Family and Medical Leave
Act, cover domestic violence victims who require leave when they or a
family member are incapacitated due to a serious health condition result-
ing from domestic or sexual violence.87 Similar analytic frameworks ren-
der sexual violence in a woman's home a civil rights violation under cir-
cumstances, for example, when a landlord or housing manager commits
the violence.88
Domestic or sexual violence committed by someone acting under color
of state law may also give rise to civil liability, although these claims are
more often adjudicated as due process or Eighth Amendment, rather than
equal protection, violations. For example, government entities and offi-
cials, such as police officers, prison guards, and other government
employees have been found liable for violating women's constitutional
rights when they have committed sexual assaults while carrying out their
85. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (rape by
client); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (unwanted touching and
offensive comments by co-workers); Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., 67 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1334 (N.D. I11. 1995) (harassment by employer's customer); Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349,
1994 WL 566943 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (harassment by co-worker); Hernandez v. Miranda
Velez, No. 92-2701, 1994 WL 394855, at *1 (D.P.R. July 20, 1994) (harassment by employer's
customer); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1025-26 (D. Nev. 1992) (harass-
ment by employer's customer); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) - (e) (2004) EEOC guidelines
confirming employers' liability for sexual harassment by co-workers and customers).
86. See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding city
liable for failing to take steps to stop a police office from harassing another officer after she
ended their relationship); see also Excel v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that
sexual harassment at work by employee's ex-husband violated Title VII).
87. This can include mental incapacity, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) result-
ing from the abuse. See, e.g., Anchorage v. Gregg, 101 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2004).
88. See, e.g., Annotation, Violations of Statutory Prohibitions Against Sex Discrimination
in Housing, 81 A.L.R. 4th 205 (2004); Wendy R. Weiser & Geoff Boehm, Housing
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 708 (2002);
LEGAL MOMENTUM, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING: A PRIMER (2003), available at http://
www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/LRKSexHarassment.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding prison official's
liability for rape and sexual assault of prisoner by prison guard); Daskalea v. District of
Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding prison officials' liability for sexual assault
of female prisoner by fellow inmates and forced striptease by prison guards); Rogers v. City of
Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding police officer liability for sexual assault
following traffic stop); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Smith v.
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job duties. 9
B. New Approaches to the Intersections of Gender-based
Violence and Discrimination
One response to the limitations of traditional civil rights approaches is
to examine how victims of domestic and sexual violence experience viola-
tions of their civil rights as a result of the violence, and to consider how
legal remedies can respond to and redress those violations. If civil rights
violations include acts that interfere with victims' ability to fully and
equally participate in institutions where discrimination is prohibited, civil
rights remedies prohibiting discrimination in those settings may be an
appropriate source of redress. For example, violence may have ramifications
in institutions with which the victim interacts even though the violence
doesn't take place in the institution itself. In the employment context, for
example, many victims of domestic violence have difficulty maintaining
their jobs as they cope with abuse. They may be fearful that their abuser
will commit an act of violence in the workplace; their batterer may inter-
fere with their ability to do their job; or they may need time off to address
legal or social service issues relating to the abuse.9 ° These women may
become subject to adverse job actions due to the abuse, and those adverse
job actions may constitute denials of their civil rights.
1. EMERGING LEGISLATION PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
Some jurisdictions have begun to recognize that taking an adverse job
action against an employee because she is the victim of abuse is a form of
discrimination. The state of Illinois and the city of New York have enacted
Cochran, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Okla. 2001) (upholding drivers' license examiner's liability
for sexual assault of prisoner on work release at drivers' license examination center); Giron v.
Corrections Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998) (upholding liability of prison guard for
sexual assault of inmate).
90. See, e.g., LEGAL MOMENTUM, THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON THE LIVES OF WORKING
WOMEN: CREATING SOLUTIONS, CREATING CHANGE (2002) (describing problems working
women face when coping with domestic violence and discussing available legal remedies),
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/pub/pubs/CreatingSolutions.pdf; Wendy R.
Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Employment Protection for Domestic Violence Victims," May-
June 2004 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 3 (analyzing available laws and legal theories for domestic vio-
lence victims who face discrimination at work); FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE (describing scope of problem and legal and policy
responses), available at http://www.endabuse.org./programs/workplace/.
91. 820 Ill. COMP. STAT. 180/30 (2004); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2001); see also Md.
Exec. Order No. 01.01.1998.25 (1998) (prohibiting unfair treatment of state employees due to
their status as domestic violence victims). For more information, see LEGAL MOMENTUM,
Discrimination Against Domestic Violence Victims, www.legalmomentum.org/html/
issues/vio/Discrim.pdf.
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laws that flatly prohibit employment discrimination against domestic vio-
lence victims.9 In the first reported decision under the New York City
law, the New York City Department of Corrections was found to have dis-
criminated against a corrections officer by terminating her while she took
approved leave time from work in order to find a new home after she left
her abusive husband.92 The facts of the case illustrate the formidable chal-
lenges battered women face when attempting to negotiate both safety and
the economic and workplace security.
Ms. Reynolds was the mother of two preteenage children. She left their
father, who abused her and was a crack and alcohol abuser with a criminal
history, and went to live with a relative. When that situation did not work
out, she requested vacation time to find a new home and was granted a
ten-day leave. At the end of that leave, she was still homeless and asked
for additional time off to continue looking for a place to live. Her employ-
er put her on sick leave and demanded that she provide them with an
address. Apparently, her employer, the department of corrections, had a
policy requiring all employees who are on sick leave to remain in their
residence except when receiving medical treatment. 3 The policy also
required employees to apprise the department of their location at all times.
Ms. Reynolds explained that she was homeless and told the department the
reason she was homeless. When the department continued to demand that
she provide an address and threatened to fire her if she did not provide one,
she gave her husband's address, where they unsuccessfully attempted to
find her. Because of her difficulty finding housing, she returned to her
husband's home briefly during this period. As she may have feared, he
continued to abuse her, and she again had to seek police intervention. She
left after he again assaulted her.
Ms. Reynolds finally obtained a stable residence when she was admit-
ted to a domestic violence shelter. She contacted the department to let
them know about her new abode and gave the shelter's office address,
since the shelter, like most shelters, did not disclose its street location. The
shelter would have told the department the shelter's location if it signed
the shelter's confidentiality form, but the department's representative
refused to sign it. The department subsequently fired Ms. Reynolds.
The court held that the department violated the antidiscrimination law
by failing to make reasonable accommodations for Ms. Reynold's status
as a homeless victim of domestic violence.94 It recognized that her loss of
a job at exactly the point where she was obtaining the assistance she needed
92. Reynolds v. Fraser, 781 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y Cty. Sup. Ct. 2004).
93. Id. at 887-88.
94. Id. at 891.
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was the precise type of harm the law was intended to prevent. The court
noted the developing public policy awareness of the ways domestic violence
interferes with a victim's ability to keep her job. The department's deci-
sion to terminate her at the very point when she was living in a shelter
with an apparent unverifiable address constituted impermissible discrimi-
nation prohibited by the statute.95 This case demonstrates the complex
interaction between abuse and economic security as well as the ways that
violence produces civil rights violations for its victims. By specifically
acknowledging the link between domestic violence and women's eco-
nomic independence and civil rights, the new New York City law and oth-
ers like it can play a critical role in victims' ability to leave the abuse and
move toward independence.
Other states have enacted similar laws that prohibit employment dis-
crimination against domestic violence victims under certain enumerated
circumstances. For example, some jurisdictions prohibit employment dis-
crimination against employees who take time off to address domestic or
sexual violence.96 Others prohibit employment discrimination against those
who take leave to pursue legal redress associated with the violence.97
Pending legislation in Congress, as well as in a number of states, would
provide similar protection.98
2. EVOLVING INTERPRETATIONS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
In jurisdictions that have not adopted these domestic violence-specific
provisions, new interpretations of more familiar antidiscrimination laws
may provide relief when domestic or sexual violence leads to discrimina-
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 8505 (2004) (prohibiting sanctioning of
employees who exercise their right to "reasonable and necessary" leave to address domestic or
sexual violence).
97. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination against employ-
ees for taking time off to obtain or attempt to obtain judicial relief in response to domestic or
sexual violence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b (2004) (prohibiting discrimination against
employees who have to participate in court appearances or in investigations or prosecutions of
a case in which the employee is a victim); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.4 (McKinney 2004) (pro-
hibiting adverse job actions against employees who take time off from work to participate in
criminal justice system); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-10 (2004) (prohibiting adverse job actions
against employees who seek or obtain or refuse to obtain protective orders).
98. See, e.g., The Security and Financial Empowerment Act, S. 1801 & H.R. 3420, 108th
Cong. (2003) (addressing a variety of workplace concerns facing victims of domestic and sex-
ual violence, including prohibition of employment discrimination); S.B. 2438 & H.B. 2123,
21 st Leg. (Haw. 2002) (prohibiting employment discrimination against domestic violence vic-
tims and providing leaves of absence for them to address legal, medical, psychological and
other needs relating to the abuse); H.B. 385, 102d Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 2001) (prohibiting
employment discrimination against domestic violence victims because of their status as battered
women or because they take domestic violence-related leaves from work).
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tory employment decisions that violate a victim's right to sex-based
equality. For example, an employee may be subject to adverse job actions
because she was the victim of abuse, and the decision may be based on
stereotypes about battered women.99 Alternatively, an employer may take
an adverse action against the victim, but not the perpetrator. That decision
may constitute impermissible disparate treatment based on the employee's
sex.1 ° In one case, for example, a domestic violence victim whose batterer
was a co-worker has alleged that the employer violated Title VII and state
law by firing her, but not penalizing her batterer, after she obtained a pro-
tective order.'01
Analogous developments provide recourse for victims of domestic and
sexual violence who face discrimination in housing even when the violence
does not take place in the home itself. Some states have enacted laws pro-
hibiting landlords or homeowners from discriminating against domestic
violence victims. 10 2 Courts have begun to recognize that adverse actions
99. Similar arguments have supported claims that municipalities violated domestic violence
victims' equal protection rights by providing less adequate police responses to domestic violence
victims than they would to victims of similar crimes between strangers. These cases have pro-
ceeded both under disparate treatment theories based on circumstantial evidence of gender bias,
and based on evidence that the police had a policy or practice of treating domestic violence victims
differently than victims of other similar acts of violence. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester,
864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1998), on remand, 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see, e.g., Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (evidence included police officer's statement
that he "did not blame the plaintiff's husband for hitting her, because of the way she was 'carrying
on'); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Smith v. City of Elyria,
857 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (allowing equal protection claim to proceed based on evi-
dence, e.g., of a written policy urging officers not to arrest a man for domestic violence in "his"
home because female complainants are often irrational and because the loss of the arrested man's
wages is detrimental to the children); but see, e.g., Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995) (rejecting claim due to lack of evidence beyond sta-
tistical evidence of low arrest rates in domestic violence cases); Ricketts v. City of Columbia,
36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995) (same). In early 2005, the United
States Supreme Court will review a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling upholding a similar
claim against a municipality on the basis that the police department's failure to enforce a domestic
violence victim's protective order violated the victim's procedural due process rights. See Gonzales
v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 417 (Nov. 1, 2004).
100. For example, an employer who fires a woman who was a victim of abuse, but keeps a
male abuser on the job, may be liable for disparate treatment sex discrimination. The fear that
retaining a female domestic violence victim would risk bringing violence to the workplace,
alone is not enough to justify the termination. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. St.
Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that employer violated Title VII when it
discharged employee who had hired an African American man in order to minimize threats
from anonymous caller who protested the hiring by threatening violence and making racially
discriminatory remarks).
101. Greer v. Beck's Pub and Grill, No. C03207OLRR (N.D. Iowa, filed Nov. 13, 2003)
(available from author).
102. See LEGAL MoMENTUM, HOUStNG DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DoMIESnc VioLENcE VICTIMs,
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/housing.pdf (listing state legislative
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taken against tenants who are coping with abuse may be a form of imper-
missible sex discrimination. For example, an Oregon property management
company agreed to end housing discrimination against domestic violence
victims after it was sued by a domestic violence victim who was evicted
under a "zero tolerance policy" under which all tenants would be evicted
if there is any evidence of violence in the household. °3 A Michigan hous-
ing commission similarly agreed to stop enforcing a "no-strike rule"
against domestic violence victims following a case in which it sought to
evict a tenant after she called the police following an assault by a former
boyfriend."° Similarly, a Vermont federal court concluded that a land-
lord's termination of a domestic violence victim's lease may have been
due to impermissible sex discrimination. 10 5
Concern about the impact of such "zero tolerance policies" on battered
women's ability to maintain their housing in the face of violence has
prompted a range of policy responses, including an ABA recommendation
supporting federal, state, local, and territorial legislation prohibiting housing
discrimination against domestic violence victims.1 °6 The issue came into
sharp focus after the Supreme Court's decision in H.U.D. v. Rucker, which
interpreted a provision of a federal antidrug law to prohibit a tenant's
eviction based on a household member's drug-related activity or violence,
regardless of whether the tenant knew about or could control the criminal
activity.0 7 Victims of domestic violence had been subject to evictions
under similar policies authorizing eviction from public housing when any
household member committed an act of violence, regardless of whether
the domestic violence victim knew about or could control the violence. In
response to advocacy efforts highlighting the impact of those policies on
domestic violence victims, HUD issued a statement urging public housing
directors to evict tenants as "the last option explored,"'' 0 8 and incorporated
recommendations into its Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook urging
initiatives that prohibit discrimination against domestic violence victims); see also Wendy R.
Weiser and Geoff Boehm, Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence,
Mar.-Apr. 2002 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 708 (2002).
103. Alvera v. Creekside Village Apartments, No. 10-99-0538-8 (HUD), available at
http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/alveradeterm.pdf.
104. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FIRST SETTLEMENT OF ITS KIND, MICHIGAN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS WILL No LONGER FACE EvIcTION, (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.
aclu.org/WomensRights/WomensRights.cfm?ID=14555&c=173.
105. Bouley v. Jacqueline Young-Sabourin, No. 1:03 CV 320 (D. Vt. Mar. 10, 2005) (avail-
able from author).
106. See http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/abahousingreport.shtml (citing recom-
mendation).
107. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
108. See Letter from Secretary Mel Martinez to Public Housing Directors, April 16, 2002,
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/Martinez4-16-021tr.pdf.
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housing managers to consider the domestic violence victim's need for safety
and housing when responding to complaints of violence in a household.19
3. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AWARENESS
The legislative and litigation inroads described above may promote the
VAWA civil rights remedy's practical goal of affording a legal remedy to
victims of domestic and sexual violence who previously lacked adequate
recourse under existing law. They may also advance the transformative
goals of reshaping public debate by reframing violence against women in
the context of civil rights violations. At the same time that litigation can
help victims of gender-based violence obtain compensation for the phys-
ical and psychic harms that result from violence, other strategies have
made critical contributions to eliminating the inequality violence against
women produces and perpetuates. Public education is one such tool. Recent
initiatives, such as campaigns to address domestic violence as a form of
torture," n0 to expose the prevalence of rape in prison,"' l and to engage men
in efforts to eliminate the discriminatory attitudes that perpetuate domestic
and sexual violence" I2 advance these broader goals. Other educational
programs, including judicial education" 3 and sexual assault prevention
initiatives" 4 continue to reveal and address the discriminatory attitudes
that allow violence against women to persist. International initiatives have
made significant inroads in recognizing violence against women as a civil
rights violation and in holding states accountable for ending it."5
109. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK, at
ch. 19 (addressing domestic violence), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/
ph/rhiip/phguidebook.cfm.
110. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, U.S.A., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TORTURE, avail-
able at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/violence/domesticviolence.html; see also Rhonda
Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence As Torture, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994).
111. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR, SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN
U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996fUsl.htm.
112. See, e.g., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, http://endabuse.org/ (describing initia-
tives, such as "Coaching Boys Into Men"); ALAN BERKOWITZ, WORKING WITH MEN TO PREVENT
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: AN OVERVIEW (2004), available at www.vawnet.org/Domestic
Violence/Research/VAWnetDocs/ARManPreventVAWl.php and www.vawnet.org/Domestic
Violence/Research/VAWnetDocs/ARManPreventVAW2.php (surveying current efforts
involving men in preventing violence against women).
113. See, e.g., NATIONAL JUDICIAL EDUCATION PROGRAM, described at http://www.legalmo-
mentum.org/njep/index.shtml.
114. See, e.g., NATIONAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CENTER, listing resources and materi-
als at http://www.nsvrc.org/resources/strategies/prevention.html.
115. See, e.g., United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 19 (11 th Sess., 1992) (declaring that "gender-based vio-
lence is a form of discrimination" and holding states responsible for exercising due diligence to
prevent violations of the rights to be free from discrimination established by the Convention to
Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, and for investigating and punishing acts of violence,
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VI. Conclusion
The VAWA civil rights remedy can be viewed as one in a line of ini-
tiatives expressly linking, and seeking to remedy, gender-based violence
as a violation of its victims' civil rights. The Morrison decision striking
the law reflected a cramped view of federal power that rejected Congress's
progressive insight that violence against women violated women's civil
rights. Nevertheless, the civil rights remedy's enactment marked a milestone
of progress in our collective understanding of violence against women as
a form of discrimination and in the panoply of remedies available to victims
of domestic violence and sexual assault. Although the civil rights remedy
no longer is available, new initiatives pick up on the aspirations that
underlay the civil rights remedy's enactment and chart new courses for
advancing women's equality rights and helping those who have survived
domestic violence and sexual assault move to safety and independence.
and for providing compensation); United National General Assembly Resolution 48/104,
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (Dec. 20, 1993) (recognizing vio-
lence against women as a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women and calling on states to condemn and take steps to eliminate it); United Nations Div.
for Advancement of Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conf. on
Women, 112-129 (Oct. 17, 1995) (recognizing that violence against women is an obstacle to
the achievement of equality and calling on states to take a range of measures to redress and
eliminate it); see generally, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights;
A Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REv. 607, 611-22
(1997) (describing history of international human rights recognition of violence against
women); see also, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in
International Courts and Tribunals: 1993-2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16 (2004) (summarizing
prosecutions of rape and sexual assault as violations of international law).
